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I. INTRODUCTION
Deadly police-citizen encounters do not occur in a vacuum.
They reflect our times and our society. Since the fatal shooting of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the nation's attention has
been riveted on police killings. In small towns and large cities,
virtually all of the victims have been African-American. In some
cases, the fatal encounters led to riots. Large-scale investigations
by the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division have provided
insight into some of the incidents.
Deadly police actions against citizens can be viewed as an
internal police problem,' as a symbol of larger societal challenges,
especially racism, or as a function of failed criminal justice
policies. On a yet larger scale, police actions, and the ensuing
community response, are intimately tied to the dominant political
and economic climate. In many parts of the country decreased
funding for vital governmental functions, especially since the
recession of 2008, has shaped police enforcement goals and tactics.
Those have contributed to the deterioration of community-police
relations and the civilian death toll at the hands of police.
Not all police departments have been impacted equally, but
many have had to continue to diversify their funding streams with
the downturn in municipal funding. The choices made to support
department budgets-and those of other governmental entitieshave impacted policing priorities and strategies, often leading to
more intensive policing of poorer and minority neighborhoods. In
turn, those decisions have increased community tensions with
police. The focus on the larger economic picture is not designed to
absolve police departments of blame for decisions made but to

1 In police abuse of civilians, the blame is often placed on a "rogue" officer. See, e.g.,
Laurence Miller, The Dorner Case: When Cops Turn Rogue and How to Prevent It, PRACTICAL
POLICE PSYCHOLOGY (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.policeone.com/health-fitnesslarticles/612046
1-The-Dorner-case-When-cops-turn-rogue-and-how-to-prevent-it/ (describing an LAPD officer
as a rogue officer). In other situations, entire police departments have been declared
responsible for police-community tensions and unconstitutional activity. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIv. & U.S. ATTY's OFFICE N. DIST. OF ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (2017) (explaining incidents of use of force inside the Chicago
Police Department); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div.,
FERGUSON REPORT].
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highlight the interdependencies between different government
entities and broader challenges police will face in restructuring.
The current economic approach is often characterized as
neoliberal.
While some commentators have criticized the
amorphous nature of the term, 2 a few of the key features of
neoliberalism can serve as a shorthand for the overall structural
approach that has created substantial economic challenges for
municipalities, their agencies, and states. 3
Neoliberal principles go beyond limited government funding
and demands of cost-effective government. 4 "The contraction of
the state through 'fiscal discipline' is only part of a wider project
affecting every part of society."5 Some have blamed neoliberalism
for greater punitiveness, though the connection may be indirect.
Harsher policing has been expected as a result of market
deregulation and the attendant social dislocations.6 Whether this
is an aspect of the current tensions between minority communities
and police remains unclear. I argue for a more direct connection.
With the downturn in funding for all municipal activity, including
policing, police forces have turned to other sources of funding.
Those have included forfeitures, citations for traffic and municipal
violations, free equipment, often donated by the Department of
Defense, police foundations, and grants from the federal and state
Pressures to make their budget enhanced the
governments.
incentives to seize private property and increase the issuance of
The latter has led to the now well-documented
tickets.

2

See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Explanations of American Punishment Policies: A National

History, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY, July 2009, at 377.

3 Some of the dominant features of neoliberalism are beyond the scope of this paper.
Among them are globalization and privatization. The latter plays a role in policing, with
the proliferation of private police forces, but also in other parts of the criminal justice
system. While the privatization of prisons to house convicted inmates has not progressed as
rapidly or widely in the United States as some feared, privatization of other parts of the
criminal justice system continues, not only in the United States but also in Great Britain.
Michael Teague, Neoliberalism, Prisons and Probation in the United States and England
and Wales, in ORGANISING NEOLIBERALISM: MARKETS, PRIVATIZATION AND JUSTICE 45, 46
(Philip Whitehead & Paul Crawshaw eds., 2012).
4 This may imply a demand for cost-efficient policing but not necessarily for a large
police force. Teague, supra note 3, at 47.
5 PHILIP WHITEHEAD, RECONCEPTUALISING THE MORAL ECONOMY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE 76 (2015) (quoting COSTAS DOUZINAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RESISTANCE IN
THE CRISIS: GREECE AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 11 (2013)).
6

Teague, supra note 3, at 46.
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reinstitution of the so-called debtor's prison for individuals who
have found themselves unable to pay off court-ordered debt.
Federal government grants in turn have imposed pressure to
measure performance, which is another key element of
neoliberalism.
Many of the traditionally used performance
measures, however, fail to consider the impact of policing choices
on community relations.
This Article, in Part II, begins with a description of how
municipalities, at least since the recession of 2008, have fallen
short of fully funding their departments. Part III focuses on four
distinct outside funding components and their impact on policing.
The first subsection discusses asset forfeitures, under both state
and federal law. Subsection two highlights revenue derived from
citations, often in the form of traffic tickets. A discussion of fees
that are being added to fines, often to fund courts, probation
The increasing
agencies, and police departments, follows.
amounts and types of fees imposed have substantially increased
the burden of citations. Failure to pay or to appear for court
The final
hearings about payment triggers arrest warrants.
subsection turns to the impact federal grant programs, including
equipment donations, have had on law enforcement. Similarly,
the contributions of police foundations have left their imprint on
enforcement strategies. Part IV is devoted to the proliferation of
measurements of police performance. Those frequently emphasize
numbers of arrests, drug or money seizures, or citations issued
without regard to the impact on community relations. Finally, the
last section illuminates how these policies have increased the
stakes in interactions between community members and police,
leading to greater dangers for both sides.
II. POLICE FUNDING: THE IMPACT OF NEOLIBERALISM
for
the
approach
accounts
Neoliberalism's
market
marketization of society, which deems all aspects of society and
This commodification has
government part of markets.7

7 Id.
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Government
increasingly manifested itself in various areas.8
agencies are conceived as service providers, with citizens as

consumers.
A market-based approach has led to the partial
privatization of even core government functions, including policing
and (external) defense. 9 The proliferation of private security
organizations may, therefore, be considered a result of neoliberal
policies and approaches. Probation agencies have been turned
from state agencies into public-private partnerships. Another
aspect of the market approach is the increasing measurement and
assessment of government services as if they were for-profit
businesses.1 0 For police, this has meant, for example, that they
have been held responsible for increases in the (violent) crime rate,
even though that measure is particularly volatile." In addition,
police activity is not the sole factor impacting crime rates.
The result of neoliberal policies, critics charge, is an increased
emphasis on "individual responsibility for behavior, less tolerance,
poverty, inequality and discrimination in terms of race and
ethnicity. . . ."1 2 Some have argued that the societal dislocations
arising from neoliberal policies-largely in the form of
unemployment or underemployment-may lead to more crime, a
greater law enforcement presence, and ultimately harsher
punishment.13
Police forces generally increased in size during the decade and a
half preceding the economic collapse of 2008, a development that
appears to support neoliberal critics. 14 Even during that time,
however, they, together with the courts and parts of corrections,
already faced budget restrictions. With the banking and loan
crisis came dramatic funding shortages for police and local
courts. 15 Federal grants disappeared, and local expenditures were
8

Philip Whitehead & Paul Crawshaw, Introduction: A Preliminary Mapping of the

Terrain 1, 2-3, in ORGANISING NEOLIBERALISM: MARKETS, PRIVATIZATION AND JUSTICE,
supra note 3.

9 Teague, supra note 3, at 46.
10 Whitehead & Crawshaw, supra note 8, at 12.
11 Teague, supra note 3, at 69.
12

Id. at 47.

13 Id. at 47-48.

14 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS, NCJ 749681, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT DATA 2 (2016).
15 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, THE IMPACT
OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN POLICE AGENCIES 10 (2011), https://cops.usdoj.
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cut across the board. The decrease in state and local tax revenue
used to fund state and local police and the courts required police to
downsize and turn to or strengthen other funding mechanisms, on
some of which they had already come to rely. 16 In addition, some
municipal courts and other criminal justice agencies have come to
depend on police to assist them in funding their operations.17
Whether the developments within the criminal justice area all
fit within the theoretical structure of neoliberalism and whether
they are as linear as described may remain unanswered.
It
remains undisputed that increasingly state entities, including
police and local courts, have been expected to contribute
financially to their operations.1 8 In egregious cases, they may have
been expected to self-fund or even serve as revenue centers.19
Such expectations explain the turn to outside revenue, including
funding through citizen-offenders and government grants.
III. ALTERNATIVE REVENUE SOURCES FOR POLICE AND RELATED
AGENCIES

Police have come to rely on a host of outside funding
mechanisms. Best known and heavily disputed are civil and
criminal forfeitures. 20 Citations and traffic tickets have been a
time-tested funding source.
Only recently, however, has the
proliferation of fees escalated the cost of tickets. Failure to pay,
even for the indigent, carries the danger of arrest and jail time,
with further fees imposed throughout the process. 21 Finally, police
have been relying on police foundations, federal grant monies and

gov/Default.asp?Item=2602; POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, IS THE ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGING How WE POLICE? 1-3 (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter
POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM].
16 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 15, at 2. See also Kevin Walby, Randy

K. Lippert & Alex Luscombe, The Police Foundation'sRise: Implications of Public Policing's
Dark Money, BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/bje/azx55.
17 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 15, at 2.
18 Id. at 1-3.

19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA'S "OFFENDER-FUNDED"

PROBATION INDUSTRY 13-14 (Feb. 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usO
214_ForUploadO.pdf.
20 Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors'
Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 508 (2016).
21

Id.
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The latter have accelerated the
equipment donations. 22
All of these funding streams have
militarization of the police.
impacted policing and ultimately negatively affected relationships
with local communities.
23
A. ASSET FORFEITURES

For about three decades already, asset forfeitures have
contributed to the coffers of federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. 24 Originally forfeiture laws were intimately
tied to drug enforcement, designed to incentivize police to engage
in more drug-related investigations. 25 While still heavily focused
on illicit narcotics, forfeiture of alleged proceeds or products and
goods used in the commission of the crime is now also permitted
26
for other offenses.
The best-known program that has influenced the allocation of
state and local police and prosecutorial resources is "equitable
sharing"-the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program
that allows local law-enforcement and prosecutor's offices to share
in civil forfeiture assets in cases of joint investigations or when the
federal government "adopts" the state seizure. 27 The forfeitures,
which do not require a criminal conviction, comprise all types of
property, including cell phones, automobiles, real estate, and
Id. at 509; Walby, Lippert & Luscombe, supranote 16.
The discussion in this section does not distinguish between civil and criminal
forfeitures. For purposes of this Article, the incentive to forfeit property to enhance the
discretionary budgets of law enforcement agencies is decisive. The specific features of the
forfeiture process are irrelevant. Civil forfeiture remains, of course, the preferred method of
law enforcement agencies because of the low procedural threshold. See generally DICK M.
22
2

CARPENTER II ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 14

(Nov. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2-edition.pdf.
24 See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws,
Policing Incentives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2118 (2007) ("DOJ's 'success'
in seizing assets in the early 1980s ... brought asset forfeiture policies to the attention of
state governments.").
25 Id. at 2114.
26 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (2016) (authorizing forfeiture for various non-drug-related offenses).
27 U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, GUIDE TO

EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1, 1-2 (Apr. 2009),

https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download [hereinafter GUIDE TO EQUITABLE
SHARING]. For a critique of how the federal government handles cash forfeitures generally,
see U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Department's
Oversight of Cash Seizure and ForfeitureActivities (March 2017), https://oig.justice.gov/report
s/2017/el702.pdf.
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cash. 28 Investigations are largely, though not necessarily, focused
on drug offenses.
To provide a sufficient incentive for local and state law
enforcement agencies to participate in a joint operation with
federal agencies, they receive up to 80% of forfeited assets. 29 To be
able to participate in the program, the states must allocate all of
these funds to the investigating law-enforcement agency. 30 The
program, embedded in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, distributed about $1.2 billion to state, local, federal, and
foreign law enforcement agencies between 2003 and 2013.31 After
federal budget cuts in late 2015, the Department of Justice
suspended the program but resumed it in March 2016.32 Police
deem "equitable sharing" allocations a federal allocation of
resources and an integral component of their budgets. 33
In addition to the federal program, every state has a forfeiture
law, largely focused on drug offenses. Indicative of the increasing
fiscal importance of these programs is that between 2002 and 2013
the total annual forfeiture revenue more than doubled in fourteen

28

GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 27, at 7.

Id. at 8. The 80% return also holds true in cases where the federal government merely
"adopts" the seized goods.
29

3

CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 28.

See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-14-318, DHS Asset Forfeiture:Additional
Actions Could Help Strengthen Controls over Equitable Sharing, 14 (Mar. 2014), http://www.
gao.gov/assests/670/667076.pdf. Other reports indicate a substantially higher payout between
2000 and 2013, in the range of $4.7 billion. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6.
32 Christopher Ingraham, The Feds Have Resumed a ControversialProgram That Lets Cops
Take Stuff and Keep It, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/w
onk/wp/2016/03/28/the-feds-have-resumed-a-controversial-program-that-lets-cops-take-stuff-a
nd-keep-it/9utm term=.940575d6395c.
The Justice Department ended one aspect of the "equitable sharing" program referred to
as "adoptive" seizures under Attorney-General Holder but Attorney-General Sessions
reinstituted it in 2017. Department of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Issues Policy and
Guidelines on FederalAdoptions of Assets Seized by State or Local Law Enforcement (July 19,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-policy-and-guidelines-fe
deral-adoptions-assets-seized-state; Department of Justice, Attorney GeneralProhibitsFederal
Agency Adoptions of Assets Seized by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Except Where
Needed to Protect Public Safety (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/attorney-gener
al-prohibits-federal-agency-adoptions-assets-seized-state-and-local-law.
See also Nora V.
Demleitner, How the government can steal your stuff: 6 questions about civil asset forfeiture
answered, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 17, 2017), https://theconversation.com/how-the-governm
ent-can-steal-your-stuff-6-questions-about-civil-asset-forfeiture-answered-81973.
3 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 29 (quoting national president of the Fraternal
Order of Police).
31
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states. 34 The individual amount of forfeited property is relatively
small, with the median value in Minnesota, for example, at $451.35
For limited value property, in particular, owners rarely challenge
This is particularly true in
the government's forfeiture. 36
jurisdictions that make it cumbersome to dispute forfeitures,
effectively requiring an investment of time and financial resources
in the form of a lawyer.
In contrast to equitable sharing, state forfeiture laws diverge
widely, in terms of substance but also with respect to allocation
provisions. 37 While seven states and the District of Columbia do
not permit law enforcement access to forfeited funds, some of the
other states allocate up to 100% to the seizing law enforcement
agency. 38 Even states that ostensibly do not assign any forfeited
proceeds to the investigating agency, may find themselves paying
agencies for the investigations, and thereby distributing all or
most of the forfeited funds to such agencies. 39 In states whose
asset forfeitures go to a general fund rather than individual
agencies, the federal program provides an alternative that allows
law enforcement agencies to continue to benefit directly. 40
Once police departments or prosecutors receive the allocated
share from equitable sharing, they may use it for a host of
purposes, though some restrictions exist. A large amount goes to
equipment purchases. 41
It has been yet more challenging to determine on what types of
budget items law enforcement agencies have been spending
revenue received from property forfeited under state laws. 4 2 Such
data is available for only a handful of states. Some of them spent

3 Id. at 5.
35 Id. at 12.
a6 Id.
37 Baicker & Jacobson, supra note 24, at 2116.
3 See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 14.
39 Id. at 16 (Indiana, which permits agencies to be reimbursed for investigative costs, has

found itself allocating all forfeited funds to these agencies).
40 For support of this substitution effect, see John L. Worrall & Tomislav V. Kovandzic, Is
Policing For Profit? Answers from Asset Forfeiture, 7 CRIM. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 227 (2008)
(describing how some agencies circumvent state restrictions on the receipt of forfeitures by
handing the proceeding over to the federal government).
41 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 39-40.
42 Id. at 7 ("In 2012, agencies in four states spent $13.7 million in state forfeiture money
on 'other.' Id.).
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a substantial percentage, ranging from 14% to 70%, on salaries. 43
In police departments that fund their personnel through
forfeitures, the pressure to forfeit assets is substantial. After all,
without forfeitures, layoffs of colleagues will become inevitable.
For state forfeitures generally, equipment also ranked among
the top budget items. Only a relatively small percentage of the
revenue from forfeited goods and cash went to supporting drug
programs or policing initiatives, even though those are being
touted as the objects of such funding." Egregious misspending on
luxury items, prohibited goods, or inappropriate expenditures such
as political consultants has also been reported. 45
There has been widespread criticism of civil forfeitures for
privileging revenue maximization over public safety. 46
The
incentives provided for forfeitures lead to the allocation of law
enforcement resources to drug investigations, and away from other
areas. Revenue demands, therefore, often determine local law
enforcement priorities. 47
Law enforcement officials have
acknowledged that civil forfeiture laws create strong incentives for
seizures.4 8
Once law enforcement becomes accustomed to the
influx of such outside resources, budgets will be built accordingly,
which will lead to yet greater dependency on forfeitures, especially
when such revenue becomes a part of payroll.
The impact of forfeiture laws on the allocation of resources
becomes most pronounced when state forfeiture laws and practices
are considered in conjunction with equitable sharing. On the one
hand, studies have indicated that a decline in state proceeds,

43 Id. at 40-41.
4 Id. at 39.

45

Id. at 41.
Once the concept is explained to them, the vast majority of Americans-84%-oppose
civil asset forfeitures, and three quarters of all Americans object to local police departments
46

keeping the forfeited assets. See EMILY EKINS, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICING IN AMERICA:
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLICE. RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL

SURVEY 57-58 (2016). As a result many states have reformed their civil asset forfeiture
laws. See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, Civil ForfeitureReforms on the State Level, http://ij.
org/activism/legislation/civil-forfeiture-legislative-highlights/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
47 Brent D. Mast, Bruce L. Benson & David W. Rasmussen, EntrepreneurialPolice and
Drug Enforcement Policy, 104 PUB. CHOICE 285, 286-88 (2000) (suggesting a substantial
increase in drug cases once police can keep assets seized in drug cases); see also Aurdlie
Ouss, Incentives Structures and Criminal Justice 1.7 (July 2015), http://aouss.github.io/juve
niles-california.pdf (stating that asset forfeiture laws change policing practices).
48 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 15.
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based either on greater procedural hurdles to forfeitures or a lower
sharing percentage, leads to an increase in equitable sharing. 49
On the other hand, research on the impact of forfeiture laws on
police budgets shows that "[1]ocal governments partially offset
police seizures by reducing their spending on police the following
year."5 0 This is even truer in times of tight fiscal budgets and
triggers a need for more forfeitures, either under state law or with
federal cooperation. Forfeiture laws, therefore, shape budgets and
ultimately impact law enforcement priorities and focus. 5 1

The asset forfeiture program indicates how the funding of even
those programs considered a core government function has
changed.
Rather than distributing responsibility for funding
police across the population through taxation, the cost is being
borne by those with allegedly tainted property, many of whom will
never be convicted of a criminal offense and many of whom may in
fact not be involved in any criminal offending.
Traffic stops often serve as a basis for seizing and forfeiting
property. 52 Many police departments have undergone training
specifically to learn how to execute warrantless highway seizures
most effectively upon a traffic stop. 5 3 In addition, many have come
to use traffic fines and citations more generally as a funding
source. 54
B. CITATIONS: FINES FOR TRAFFIC AND MUNICIPAL VIOLATIONS

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, funding for
municipalities, law enforcement agencies, courts, and probation
departments has been upended. Long before the Department of
Justice's investigation into police and court practices in Ferguson,
there were reports of towns practically funding themselves
through traffic fines, especially for speeding violations. Since
speeding is considered a public safety issue, it has sometimes been
49 See Jefferson Holcomb, Tomislav Kovandzic & Marian Williams, Civil Asset Forfeiture,
Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 276
(2011) (describing how Missouri law enforcement agencies began using federal equitable
sharing to circumvent a state law directing forfeiture funds to an education fund).
5o Baicker & Jacobson, supra note 24, at 2115.
51 Id.
52 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 16.
53 Id. at 29.

54 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 15, at 1-3.
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challenging to uncover the revenue-generation abuse that may
accompany it.

Randolph, a small town on the opposite side of the state of
Missouri from Ferguson, exemplifies the misuse of traffic tickets.
Police enforcement there served solely as a speed trap for the
unwary.55 Municipal abuses of traffic fines are legion, though
largely restricted to small towns. In some of the most egregious
cases the alleged offenders were arrested and held in jail for minor
violations, to assure payment.56 This type of police behavior
creates insecurity rather than safety in a community.57
Even though Missouri state law mandates that ticket
collections from state and federal highways not surpass about a
third of a town's budget,5 8 both Ferguson and Randolph violated
that benchmark. 59 Other states have also limited the percentage
of collections that can be dedicated to a municipality's budget.
Some restrict assignment of fees for traffic violations on state
highways to state coffers. 60 In return, towns receive either a
percentage or a flat fee for every ticket. 61 In some cases those may
constitute a substantial percentage of a town's budget. Ultimately,
the revenue derived from traffic tickets and municipal code
violations gets allocated in various ways, depending on the state.
In Minnesota, for example, fines are set by state statute, with a

55 Todd C. Frankel, Missouri'sFirst Official Speed-trap Town Fingered in Audit, ST. LouIs
POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/missouri-s-first-official-sp
eed-trap-town-fingered-in-auditarticle_19e8a57e-cO4c-l1df-89fe-00127992bc8b.html.
56

Id.

See, e.g., Ken Armstrong, The Woman Who Spent Six Years Fightinga Traffic Stop, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/10/the-wom
an-who-spent-six-years-fighting-a-traffic-stop#.CLpXCrYmx (describing ticketing protestees in
Woodworth, Louisiana). See also Jonathon M. Seidl, There's Something Odd About Some
Tickets in Texas - and a Judge has Resigned Over It, THE BLAZE (June 4, 2015), http://www.
theblaze.com/stories/2015/06/04/in-a-few-small-texas-towns-police-are-issuing-so-many-speed
ing-tickets-a-local-judge-quit-on-principlel (describing a Texas highway as ticket terror for
57

drivers); SAM J. PIGNO, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SAM J. PIGNO: A SCHOOL SYSTEM'S FALL INTO

DISGRACE 16-17 (2011).
58 Other states have similar limitations.
See Karen Aho, The Town That Lived Off
Speeding Tickets, Fox BuS. (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2011/10/19/
town-that-lived-off-speeding-tickets.html.
69 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CivIL RIGHTS DIV., FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
6
61

Id. at 14.
See Aho, supra note 58.
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majority of the revenue reverting to the state. 62 The rest goes to
the city, though the individual allocations differ between
individual cities and the state. Because of the variability of such
decisions even within the same state, specific funding schemes and
the dependence of law enforcement agencies and municipalities on
fines are often difficult to uncover.
While the most pervasive, traffic fines are not the only financial
penalties that may benefit law enforcement. Under Tennessee
law, for example, 50% of mandatory minimum fines required upon
conviction of certain drug offenses will flow back to the agency
responsible for the arrest that led to the conviction. 63 Similarly,
certain code violations may underwrite law enforcement budgets.
As regulation has increased, there are ever more opportunities
to run afoul of municipal codes and traffic rules. Originally
designed to protect public safety, fiscal pressures have now
Data indicates that economically
captured enforcement.
challenging times lead to a greater number of traffic tickets.6 4
Even though there is no inevitable conflict between financial
incentives and public safety,'65 enhanced enforcement in times of

fiscal straits raises questions about the appropriateness and
effectiveness of such enforcement and its community impact.
Lack of sufficient data makes it currently impossible to assess
the total amount of fines imposed in the United States. 66
Generally fines have been calibrated to middle class income. Since
62 Heather
Brown, Good Question: Where Does Traffic Ticket Money Go?, CBS
MINNESOTA (June 27, 2013), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2013/06/27/good-question-wheredoes-trafflc-ticket-money-go.
6

TENN. CODE ANN.

§

39-17-428 (2016). See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform 13
(Sept. 2016).
64 See, e.g., THOMAS A. GARRET & GARY WAGNER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, ARE
TRAFFIC TICKETS COUNTERCYCLICAL? (2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra

ct id=923158 (indicating that negative changes in local government revenue lead to an
increase in the number of traffic tickets); Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in
the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J. LAW
& ECON. 71, 71 (2009).
6 Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How
Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 J.L. & ECON. 863, 863 (2011) (the decrease
in traffic accidents in Massachusetts towns occurred with the primary enforcement target
being out-of-town drivers).
6 ANNE MORRISON PIEHL & GEOFFREY WILLIAMS, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE IMPOSITION OF FINES 4 (2010), http://www.

nber.orgpapers/wl6476.pdf.
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the amounts are fixed and assessed without consideration of
financial resources,6 7 their impact on individuals varies
dramatically.
In light of the increasing income and wealth
stratification in the United States, fines today range from being a
nuisance to serving as a substantial punishment. The current
regime of financial sanctions does not present a proportionate
measure of punishment. In addition, an increase in fines imposed
during economically challenging times has the most negative
impact on those already heavily affected by the economic
downturn.
Those able to pay promptly, and without coming into direct
contact with the court system, can quickly regain their status as
law-abiding citizens. Those, however, who have to appear in court
and are unable to make payments, are being stigmatized and
labeled as lawbreakers. Societal perception may also contribute to
a self-understanding of being lawless and immoral. 68
Neither the exploitation of citations nor the racial impact of the
practice is limited to Missouri. A recent report by the Lawyers
Committee of San Francisco indicates that some California cities
have similarly collected revenue through targeted fining. 69 The
report shows that the enforcement of traffic laws does not fall
equally upon all sectors of society. Instead the fining practice
disproportionately impacts African-Americans and Hispanics, who
statistically also fall into the economically more disadvantaged
strata of society. 70 African-Americans are between two and four
times more likely to be pulled over than whites. Racial disparity
was also stark in Ferguson and in a number of adjacent
communities.7 1
In many states non-payment of fines-or failure to appear,
often because of inability to pay-leads to the suspension of one's

67 See, e.g., id. at 14-18 (suggesting a system where fines are structured using a formula
counting for net worth, income and other variables).
68 See, e.g., Helen Wells, Getting Around and Getting On: Self-Interested Resistance to
Technology in Law Enforcement Contexts, 11 ANN. REV. Soc. SCI. 175 (2015).
69 STEPHEN BINGHAM ET AL., EAST BAY COMMUNITY LAW CENTER, STOPPED, FINED,
ARRESTED, RACIAL BIAS IN POLICING AND TRAFFIC COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2016).

70

Id.

71

ArchCity Defenders, Municipal Courts White Paper, MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER

3-5 (2014).
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license. 72 Even in states in which a means test is mandated,
courts usually dispense with it and instead revoke the license. In
California over 4 million drivers-17% of the adult populationhave their licenses suspended for failure to appear in court or pay
a fine. 7 3 In Virginia one in six drivers has similarly lost his or her
Association of Motor Vehicle
license. 74 The American
Administrators has declared it dangerous to suspend licenses for
reasons of non-payment because it diverts police from public safety
priorities.75

Because of disparate enforcement and ticketing patterns and
racialized economic disadvantage, suspensions in California are
five times the state average in Black and Latino communities.7 6
Arrests for driving with a suspended license based on failure to
pay for an infraction are also far more likely for African-American
drivers.7'
Sanctions for non-payment of fines are particularly troubling as
the amount owed for citations has disproportionately increased
over the last few years. The reason is the proliferation of fees,
imposed on top of fines. Those are largely used to fund unrelated

72 Aimee Picchi, How a Minor Ticket Can Cost You Your Driver's License, CBS NEWS (Apr.
8, 2015, 7:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-a-minor-ticket-can-cost-you-your-driv
ers-license/. Suspension of driver's licenses creates not only potential law-enforcement and
insurance problems. Frequently, a suspended license leads to job loss, as a New Jersey study
indicates. There almost half of the people whose licenses were suspended lost their
employment. Without a license, a person encounters increased challenges in regaining
employment as ever more low- and middle-income jobs require a license. In fact, the
possession of a driver's license predicts sustained employment more accurately than a General
Educational Development (GED) diploma. Id.
7 Alex Beader Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area et al.,
Not Just a Fergusonproblem: How Traffic Courts Drive Inequality in California (Apr. 2015).
7 Amanda Whiting, 75 Percent of All Suspended Drivers in Virginia Are in a Debtor's
Prison Scenario, WASHINGTONIAN (July 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonian.com/2016/07/
21/75-suspended-drivers-virginia-debtors-prison-scenario/.
75 Dean Seal, Lawsuit Says DMV's License Suspension Policy Creates 7ecipe for Disaster,'
(Dec. 17, 2106), DAILY PROGRESS, http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/localllawsuit-says-dm
v-s-license-suspension-policy-creates-recipe-for/article_7c494499-ec71-5e44-a207-d3c82cc24
06c.html.

76

BINGHAM ET AL., supra note 69.

n Id. The report indicates, however, that police do not arrest everyone who is driving
with a suspended license based on failure to pay or to appear. Id. at 18. Many states do not
report the basis for an underlying warrant or failure to appear. It is, therefore, impossible
to ascertain how many arrest warrants are executed for those reasons rather than the
commission of an offense. Id.
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state obligations, including local courts and other municipal
functions.
C. COURT FEES

A host of fees have supplemented and enlarged the cost of the
underlying citation, often exponentially increasing it.
The
amounts of fees have increased; new types of fees have been
created; the number of agencies assessing criminal justice-related
fees has proliferated.7 8 In California, for example, a base fine of
$100, for a traffic citation, will cost the offender $490 because of
various add-ons.7 9 Should the person fail to appear, the cost
balloons to $815.80 Many offenders who would have been able to
pay the fine, therefore, find themselves in default because of their
inability to pay off the fees. Today, fees are assessed for a wide
variety of elements integral to the criminal justice process or
attendant to the collection of criminal justice debt.
Fees are not novel in the criminal justice process. At least one
state assessed jail costs and fees for probationers by the 1920's.81
In 1980 ten states imposed probation supervision fees, a number
that had almost tripled ten years later. 82 The same fee explosion
occurred with respect to parole supervision.
The impact of such fees falls disproportionately on the poor.
The imposition of additional cost for slow payment or failure to
pay-interest, late fees, collection agency fees-further aggravates
the situation, leading to what has been dubbed, the "poverty
trap." 83 California alone currently has $10 billion in uncollected
court-ordered debt. 84

78

AMERICAN PROBATION AND

PAROLE ASSOCIATION, ISSUE PAPER: SUPERVISION FEES

(2001), https://www.appa-net.org/eweblDynamiepage.aspx?site=APPA_2&webcode=IBIssueP
This is also true for felony and
aper&wps-key-bbe81Oce-4464-4519-ald7-4993574a8d61.
misdemeanor convictions. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing
Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115
AM. J. Soc. 1753, 1758-60 (2010).
7

BINGHAM ET AL., supra note 69, at 23.

8 Id.
81 Id.
82 AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 78.
83 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 63, at 18.
8
BRIGHAM ET AL., supra note 69.
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It is not only the philosophy underlying such fees that has been
Data on supervision fees
questioned but also their efficacy.
indicates "there is an inverse relationship between the total
amount charged and the percentage collected per offender," which
counsels against fee hikes and the stacking of multiple fees.8 5
Nevertheless, at least in some locales, fees appear to fulfill the
purpose for which they were created, to fund criminal justice
agencies and local courts. For some agencies, fees amount to half
of their budget. "The criminal justice system in Orleans Parish
[New Orleans] would simply cease to function," were it not funded
by fines and fees. 86 The fees assist overburdened and underfunded
local law enforcement, court, and corrections budgets, and
therefore indirectly provide local tax relief.8 7

Often fees are

budgeted to supplant other sources of revenue, creating the need
to collect such fees to make the budget. Growing dependence on
fees also leads to ongoing pressures to assess new fees, increase
existing fees, and assure collections on these fees.8 8 In turn the
need for such fees, especially when their collection is built into
budget models, creates conflicts of interests. 89 Some commentators
have characterized these fiscal developments as "de facto
privatization of local justice systems," which is aligned with
including privatization of
tendencies,
greater neoliberal
government assets. 90
Studies indicate that in many cases revenue assumptions are
ephemeral once the cost of debt collection, and especially jail cost
for those failing to pay, are included in the calculation.9 1 In some
situations, however, the beneficiaries of the revenue are able to

AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 78.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S NEW
DEBTORS' PRISONS 25 (2010) [hereinafter ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY].
8
AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 78.
8

8

as

Id.

89 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 63, at 7-8;
ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 86, at 26.

9 Darryl K. Brown, Decriminalization,Regulation, Privatization:A Response to Professor
Natapoff, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 14 (2016).
91 See MATHILDE LAISNE, JON WOOL & CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, VERA INSTITUTE OF
&

JUSTICE, POST DUE: EXAMINING THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHARGING FOR JUSTICE
IN NEW ORLEANS 25 (2017). For other examples, see REBEKAH DILLER, ALICIA BANNON
MITALI NAGRECHA, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO
REENTRY 25-26 (Oct. 2010).
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allocate the cost of these debt programs onto other players in the
system. 92 In too many cases, however, such costs fail to be
considered. One is left to wonder, therefore, whether these fees
may be designed as much for punitive as for budgetary purposes.
Increasingly, financial pressures on local governments and
courts, which have triggered the propagation of fees, have led to
failures to pay. After all, fee amounts are not based on an
offender's means.9 3 In addition, localities in which tax income is
depressed because of economic stagnation tend to charge the
highest fees, imposing the burden on an already impoverished
population. 94
Even though the proponents of criminal justice fees argue that
fee waivers are common and probationers and parolees are not
revoked for failure to pay such fees or appear in court, 95
presumably some threat has to stand behind the payment.
Collection efforts vary widely. 9 6 There are indications that in a
substantial amount of jurisdictions arrest and jail time are being
used to incentivize payments.9 7 While arrest may not befall all of
those with an outstanding warrant for failure to pay, the
discretion built into the police response creates substantial
uncertainty and tension in traffic stops. Courts generally seem to
assume that failure to pay is willful, and rarely assess an
offender's ability to pay either at the initial imposition of fees or at
the point of revocation. 98
Opponents of fees have argued that these practices may lead an
offender to (re)turn to crime to meet these financial demands, 99 or
92 See Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy
Responses to Modern Debtors'Prisons,34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 111 (2015) (stating that
the entity seeking the fine or fee is often not the same entity that is paying the cost of
incarceration).
93 Teague, supra note 3, at 61.
9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 14.

AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 78.
96 See Harris, Evans & Beckett, supra note 78, at 1759 (describing sources of collections
95

efforts).
9
See, e.g., FOSTER COOK, TASC: JEFFERSON COUNTY'S COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
PROGRAM, THE BURDEN OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IN ALABAMA: 2014 PARTICIPANT SELFREPORT SURVEY 15 (2014).
9
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 39.

9 Teague, supra note 3, at 62. Empirical evidence that court fines and fees lead to the
commission of crime exists at least in one U.S. state, Alabama. COOK, supra note 97, at 11-12.
The crimes reported consist largely of drug sales and theft. Id. at 12. For a Finnish study
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at least abscond from supervision. If an offender cannot meet
required payments, there is a greater likelihood that he will not
come to a probation or court meeting. 100 "Revocations for new
crimes or for failure to report may simply mask fee overload."10 1 In
fact, criminal justice debt may be particularly detrimental for
those offenders who desire to lead a socially productive life. 102
Some have, therefore, suggested individualized payment plans, a
partial write-off on criminal justice debt, 103 and community service
in lieu of financial sanctions.
To assure payments, some jurisdictions have chosen another
path. A number of states have put offenders on probation who
would have otherwise received only a citation, to retain ongoing
control over them. Some have chosen privately owned probation
companies to supervise offenders whose sanction consisted solely
of a fine. 0 4 These probation companies effectively function as
collection agencies for fines and fees.
"Financial considerations and budgetary constraints played a
major part in the privatization of probation supervision
services."105 These services promise to operate cost-free to local
and state governments and the taxpayer, with only the offender
paying them a service fee, 106 an additional fee for the one in the
worst economic position to pay it.107 Failures are frequent, as the

indicating that debt default leads to an increase in crime, see generally Mikko Aaltonen, Atte
Oksanen & Janne Kivivuori, Debt Problemsand Crime, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 307 (2016).
100 Christine S. Schloss & Leanne F. Alarid, Standards in the Privatizationof Probation
Services: A Statutory Analysis, 32 CRIM. J. REV. 233, 239 (2007).
101 AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 78.
102 See Aaltonen, Oksanen & Kivivuori, supra note 99, at 327 (discussing how debt poses
obstacles to those with a criminal justice record).
103 See, e.g., PIEHL & WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 10-11; MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, NCPA
POLICY REPORT, PRIVATIZING PROBATION AND PAROLE, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st233.pdf;
RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS JUSTICE CTR.,
REPAYING DEBTS 16 (2007).
104 For a history of the growth of private probation, see generally Schloss & Alarid, supra
note 100.
105 Id. at 238.
106 Teague, supra note 3, at 59; CSRA Probation Services, Inc., About (2016), http://www.
For a strong critique of CSRA Probation Services, see
csraprobation.com/about.htm.
generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 19.
107 Not only private probation agencies charge fees. In Massachusetts a probationer, with
an average probation length, will owe between $850 and $1,300 in probation fees. The cost
falls disproportionately on the poorest part of the population. WENDY SAWYER, PRISON
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total cost of a relatively minor infraction has yet again been
increased, often substantially. 108
The stakes are higher, too. Failure to pay amounts to failure on
probation. That means courts will issue arrest warrants that often
allow the probation officer-and any law-enforcement officer-to
intervene. While these warrants are generally designed to get a
probationer to a revocation hearing, the probation service uses
them to exert payment pressure on the individual and his
family.109 Even if in most jurisdictions probationers are only very
rarely revoked for failure to pay, frequently their probationary
period is extended.11 0 That means yet again increased fees."'
Monetary payments have been used not only to punish but also
to guarantee certain actions, such as appearance in court. At least
one commentator has even argued for probationers and parolees to
post a bail-like amount to assure that they remain law abiding.112
Those unable to self-finance would have access to a bail-type
bondsmen. The proposed structure combines privatization with
traditional government oversight, and again uses money as the
primary guarantor of law-abiding behavior. This proposal, like the
fines-and-fee structure, ties financial responsibility closely to
accountability, and ultimately to individual choice.11 3 Both of
those features are deemed integral components of neoliberalism.
The concept that individual offenders must pay for the system
surrounding their punishment is based on the notion of individual

POLICY
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MASSACHUSETTS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/probation/ma-report.html.
108 According to the Association of Credit and Collection Professionals, lenders that can
choose their creditors will, at best, recover 92% of the debt. PIEHL & WILLIAMS, supra note
66, at 7. This data indicates that collection rates on fines should be substantially lower, and
likely have a ceiling.
10 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 51.
110 Schloss & Alarid, supra note 100, at 239 (citing a study from Wyoming).

A number of
Missouri jurisdictions, however, detain individuals unable to pay fines imposed upon them.
ArchCitf Defenders, supra note 71. That means either that the "free" private probation
service is not entirely cost-free to the jurisdiction and its taxpayers or that those costs are
carried by a third party, such as the state.
111 For a comprehensive proposal on how to address the proliferation of criminal justice
debt and its negative ramifications, see generally ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE
COURT ADMINISTRATORS, THE END OF DEBTORS' PRISONS: EFFECTIVE COURT POLICIES FOR
SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS (2015-2016).
112 REYNOLDS, supra note 103.
113

Id. at i. Cf. Marsh & Gerrick, supranote 92, at 117-19.
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responsibility. 1 1 4 After all "neoliberalism prioritises individual
responsibility for offending behavior and accords a lesser degree of
attention to the social context of crime." 115 This assumption of
individual culpability allows for increased punitiveness, 116 and
may also explain why judges are generally reluctant to
acknowledge indigency. Monetary payments are ultimately meant
to approximate the total costs the criminal justice system incurred
for a violation of community norms. They function, therefore, both
as accountability measures and a typical market response.
The larger issue standing behind these fiscal assessments is the
definition of equality. In contrast to Western Europe where finesor at least further penalties for failure to pay-are based on an
assessment of the offender's financial ability to pay, 117 in the United
States equality remains conceived as equal treatment without
regard to context. Every offender, therefore, receives the same fine.
Pilot programs that used fiscal ability to assess the punitiveness of
a sanction have been limited over time or quickly abandoned. This
approach to equality is tied to strong individualism and a
"commitment to individual effort and responsibility." 118 While
Americans apparently believe in welfare for the poor, they equally
strongly question whether these programs assist and reward the
undeserving.1 19 A similar belief likely militates against reduced
fines, as those unable to pay are more likely suspected of refusing to
earn an income or misrepresenting their income level. Fairness
therefore has come to be defined as the imposition of the same
amount of user fees once someone has violated a regulation. 120
Suspicions of lack of deservedness are closely connected to race.

114

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at 38.

Teague, supra note 3, at 60; WHITEHEAD, supra note 5, at 46.
Teague, supra note 3, at 55 (explaining that legislatures have increased sentences as a
result of the overall punitive climate and neoliberal culture).
n1 See, e.g., Patricia Faraldo-Cabana, Towards Equalisation of the Impact of the Penal
Fine: Why the Wealth of the Offender Was Taken into Account, 3 INT'L J. CRIME, JUST.
Soc. DEMOCRACY 3 (2014) (explaining Europe's transition to establishing the amount of
fines in relation to the offender's wealth).
118 MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 2 (1999).
119 Id. at 2-3 (explaining that Americans largely believe government support should be
tied to merit and deservedness).
120 Brown, supra note 90, at 15 ("[I]t is fair to impose outsized financial burdens for
administrating justice on those who run afoul of even the most petty of regulations.").
115

&

116
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White Americans tend to believe that most welfare recipients are
black and that they are in that situation because of a lack of work
ethic. 12 1 Therefore, questions of race may (again) overshadow
decisions within the criminal justice system that are based on
socioeconomic differences.
A less disputed measure than the funding of law enforcement
agencies through offenders has been law enforcement receipt of
money from the federal government, in the form of grants. Still
those have had a substantial impact on local priorities. In addition,
some of the federal support has furthered the militarization of
police, leading to strained community-police relations.
D. GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND EQUIPMENT "FREEBIES"

Over the last four decades local police have benefitted
substantially from grant funding.
While most of the grants
originate with the federal or state governments, some private
grants are also available to select police forces. 122 In 1997 the
Office of Justice programs expended over $2 billion in grants. 123
By 1998, sixty Florida police departments in cities with
populations between 10,000 and 49,000 indicated that 5% of their
budgets came from grants, with almost half of them budgeting for
such funds. 124 These police agencies signaled positive impact from
the grants, including improved relationships with the community.
Some federal funding of local police departments has been
criticized as violative of the state-federal separation of policing and
as ineffective, if not downright wasteful. The COPS program, for
example, which promised an additional 100,000 police officers,
never achieved its goal.1 25 In part, police chiefs around the country
121 GILENS, supra note 118, at 3.
122 See Sarah Whelan, Private Fundingfor Public Safety: Know Where to Look for Grants,
POLICEONE.COM (May 22, 2012), https://www.policeone.comlgrants/articles/5602976-privatefunding-for-public-safety-know-where-to-look-for-grants/ (describing corporate foundations,
family foundations, and community foundations as public funding sources). In addition,
police foundations may funnel money from private corporations to the police. See Walby,
Lippert & Luscombe, supranote 16.
123 John Van Etten, The Impact of Grants on Police Agencies, https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/
cms/FCJEI/Programsl/SLP/Documents/Full-Text/VanEtten.aspx.
124

Id.

See David B. Muhlhausen & Erica Little, Grants and Crime Rates: No Connection Except
for Waste and Abuse, 2015 BACKGROUNDER 1, 4 (2007) (describing how Boston's mayor blamed
the Bush Administration for his inability to properly staff the city's police department).
125
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seem to have allocated funds to other priorities, and mayors failed
to support the staffing levels once the federal grants were
discontinued. 126
The impact of specific grant programs on police-community
Presumably some
relations remains largely unexplored. 127
departments were able to improve relations while others may have
The
focused on changes and improvement in other areas.
accountability measurements imposed by the largest of these grant
programs, the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
program (JAG) may have led to more arrests, independent of their
impact on the crime rate or public safety. 128 Some countervailing
developments may have further thwarted any positive impact
these grants may have had on communities. Despite substantial
criticism of the military-style equipment delivered to local law
enforcement agencies, a wide variety of programs still allow for
new and surplus equipment to be dispensed to local police.1 29
Among these are the so-called 1033 program, named after the
section which authorized it, which allows state and local law
enforcement to receive military equipment, free of charge, from the
Department of Defense, the 1122 program that provides volume
discounts for new equipment to be used in counter-drug activities,
and the Department of Homeland Security's anti-terrorism grant
programs. 130 The total amount of equipment transferred through
these channels in the last two decades runs around $4.3 billion. 13 1
Easy access to military grade weaponry has increasingly
militarized even local police, smaller and rural departments.
Another indication of the militarization of police is the
proliferation of local SWAT teams since the onset of the War on

Id.
See David Peter B. Kraska & Louis J. Cubellis, Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond:
Making Sense of American Paramilitary Policing, 14 JUST. Q. 607, 623 (Dec. 1997)
(explaining that community policing has been integrated into the militarization of police).
128 See infra Section IV.
126
127

129

See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, FUNDING FOR EQUIPMENT, http://www.nij.gov/fundin

g/Pages/equipment-funding.aspx (listing nine programs that provide funding for equipment
purchases).
130 Excessive Federal Property, JUST. TECH. INFO. CTR., https://justnet.org/resources/Exce
ss-Federal-Property.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017); Law Enforcement Resources, DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/law-eforcement-resources.
131 Christopher Ingraham, The Pentagon Gave Nearly Half a Billion Dollars of Military
Gear to Local Law Enforcement Last Year, WASH. POST. WONKBLOG (Aug. 14, 2014).
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Drugs. 132 The spread of such units, and their increased use, may be
closely connected to police concerns about the safety of officers. 133
Even smaller police departments have used SWAT teams,
frequently as patrol units that focus on "Terry stops." 1 34 They
seem to apply the "broken windows" theory of policing by
addressing not only violent threats but also "illegal parking, loud
music, bums, neighbor troubles." 135 Yet one of their primary focus
points has been executing search and arrest warrants, usually
focused on drug offenses. 136 While research is limited, annually
between 50,000 and 80,000 SWAT searches are being executed,
many of them involving forced entry. 137 SWAT raids focus
disproportionately on African-Americans, and to a lesser extent
Latinos. 138
These raids, however, do not appear targeted
effectively as data confirms that in more than a third of them, no
contraband is being found. 139 Highly publicized cases of false entry
have added to distrust in minority communities that feel often not
only over-policed but overly militarized.
As military equipment is being given out either without any
expectation of compensation or for sharply reduced cost, local
police departments are not required to justify their requests or
account for their distribution or use of the equipment. Federal
grants, on the other hand, require meticulous accounting of
allocated resources. With accountability a standard feature of
neoliberalism, measurements have become ubiquitous in police
departments.

132 See Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 127 (noting that over 65% of departments requested
a SWAT team); Timothy MacDonnell, When More is Less? SWAT and ProceduralJustice, 23

WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 135 (2016); COMM. ON POLICING REFORMS, THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DEMILITARIZING AMERICA'S POLICE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

11 (2016) (explaining that the number of SWAT teams increased during the War on Drugs).
133 Kraska & Cubellis, supra note 127, at 619-20.
13 Id. at 616-17.
1m See id. at 623-24 (quoting a SWAT-type commander).
136 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION
OF AMERICAN POLICING 31 (June 2014) [hereinafter ACLU, WAR COMES HOME].
137 American Civil Liberties Union, The Excessive Militarization of American Policing
(Apr. 2015).
1- ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 136, at 5.
139 Id. at 35.
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IV. PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Among the features considered integral to neoliberalism is
individual accountability. In the criminal justice system, this is
most palpable in the demand for offender accountability. 14 0 It may
take the form of fines and fees, not only to pay for the harm
inflicted but also for the cost the criminal justice system incurred
in addressing the rule violation. Another example is drug testing
while an offender is under supervision.
Accountability in the form of performance measures is also
demanded of organizations and agencies. 14 1 The creation of a
performance culture is an aspect of the neoliberal approach. 142
The most widely known police assessment and measurement tool
now is Compstat. Compstat allows police, by relying on extensive
analysis of data, to react faster to crime and to put in place
preventative measures more effectively. 143
Police performance measures are manifold. 144 Many scholars
support broad performance measures that are goal-oriented and
include, for example, "citizen satisfaction with police." 14 5

Others,

such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) under Chief
Bratton, advocated most forcefully for reported crime as the

140 Accountability and individual responsibility extend also to victims or potential victims.
Self- or industry-protection in the form of electronic immobilizers and central deadlocking
systems in cars or a combination of home security devices have led to a substantial decline
in car theft and burglaries. Advocates of the security hypothesis, therefore, urge market
incentives and preventive policies to change criminal opportunity. See generally Graham
Farrell, Nick Tilley & Andromachi Tseloni, Why the Crime Drop?, 43 CRIME & JUST. 421
(2014).
141 Cf. E.R. Maguire, Measuring the Performanceof Law Enforcement Agencies: Part 1 of a 2Part Article, 83 CALEA UPDATE MAGAZINE, Sept. 2003 (discussing wide area of organizations,
situations and individuals subjected to performance measures within the last two decades).
142 Cf. WHITEHEAD, supra note 5, at 47-48 (discussing introduction of performance culture
in British probation service).
143 For an introduction to Compstat, see generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, COMPSTAT: ITS ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2013).

144

A substantial amount of literature exists on best practices for measuring police

See generally MALCOLM K. SPARROW, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING:
performance.
MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN A MODERN POLICE ORGANIZATION (Mar. 2015), http://www.nc

For an outstanding overview of the literature on police
jrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/248476.pdf.
performance measures, see Neena Tiwana, Garry Bass & Graham Farrell, Police
Performance Measurement: an Annotated Bibliography, 4 CRIME SCI. 1 (2015).
14s Maguire, supra note 141.
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primary performance measure. 146 In addition to the latter, many
police departments emphasize productivity measures, such as
numbers of arrests or citations issued. 147 These data points are
fraught with challenges, however.
National arrest data have been criticized for being
incomparable and unhelpful since there is no agreed upon
definition of arrest.
In addition, whether an arrest was
appropriate in an individual case cannot be determined from the
fact that there was an arrest. For citations, there is no national
database even though police departments collect such information.
There is wide disparity in the use of citations, in both the form of
traffic tickets and in lieu of arrests for misdemeanors. Citations
and arrest data are frequently classified as "output" rather than
"'outcome" measures as they measure only activity but do not
reflect the value of such activity. 148 Similarly, police frequently
count money or drugs seized even though quantity does not
capture the effectiveness of law enforcement. 149 Accountability,
consistency and efficiency are laudable goals but some
measurables fail to capture the full effectiveness of police work,
the impact on the community and the effect on public safety and
crime rates. For these reasons, commentators have advocated for
measures that connote value added, such as an improvement in
community-police relations.
Arrest and citation figures do not capture negative externalities
of high arrest and citation policies. Those include financial costs to
An
the department and the judicial and corrections systems.
additional negative is the impact on community relations, especially
in minority neighborhoods.
Trust relationships are depleted
through an extensive display and use of force and authority.15 0
While multidimensional, community-policing oriented goals are
increasingly
being
proposed
and
implemented, 15 1
many

146

Id.

SPARROW, supra note 144, at 2. For a sharp critique of these measurements, see id. at
3-5 (listing examples of performance measuring categories).
148 Maguire, supra note 141.
147

149

INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING FUNDING TO

REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION: A POLICY FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSAL 4 (2013).

150 For an insightful analogy between crime reduction and crime reduction minus financial
cost and use of force as gross and net revenue, see SPARROW, supra note 144, at 12-13.
151 Maguire, supra note 141.
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departments have retained traditional output goals. The larger
economic framework in which many police departments operate also
reinforces the use of these measures.
Federal grants include specific performance measures. The
JAG program, for example, requires the following: number of
arrests, of gun crime charges, of warrants, and of task force
cases. 152 The problem with these indicators is that, again "[t]hey
measure activity, not productivity." 15 3 More problematically, they
While police chiefs recognize the
"distort[] incentives."15 4
difficulties with these quantitative measurements, to get grants
renewed, they have to collect these data points and document
effectiveness through them.
The police chief, the local chief judge, or the mayor may also set
out success measures in terms of numbers of tickets written or
fines imposed. When municipal or police funding depends, in part,
on the income from traffic control measures, these measures will
be crucial for continuing operations and retaining staffing levels.
In these cases, performance evaluations of officers are intimately
tied to the number of tickets written. This increases the pressure
on officers to issue citations in all situations.
In some jurisdictions, the pressures exerted by performance
measures have led to extensive data manipulation. The NYPD, for
example, suppressed crime reports and misclassified crimes to
"[I]ntense
create the impression of greater crime drops. 155
pressure for a reduction in crime numbers is liable - for many
reasons well understood throughout private industry and in public
management - to produce corruption, manipulation of statistics,
and other patterns of behavior not in the public interest. . . ."16
Some of the data manipulation may also result from rank-and-file
opposition to neoliberal reforms and the extensive demands for
data measurements. Some officers believe that these performance
measures undermine the distinctiveness of policing. Others see
the data collections as irrelevant to the primary goal of crime

162 CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 149, at 24.
153 Id. (italics omitted).
154 Id. (italics omitted). The Brennan Center report charges that these incentives lead to
mass incarceration.
155 SPARROW, supra note 144, at 25-27.
156 Id. at 27.

1074

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1047

fighting. Underlying the opposition may be an understanding of
policing as a public good rather than a relationship between a
service provider and a consumer, which is the way in which
neoliberalism views community-police relations.1 5 7
The newer, already available data measurements would counter
some of the current, distorting incentives in policing and the
demands imposed by the need for alternative funding. They may
be more difficult to collect and assess than traditional output
measures, however.
Those reinforce the strategies used,
frequently worsening relationships with the community, especially
minority communities.
Alternatively, communities may use
neoliberal tools by demanding that police treat them as
"customers."
That approach would require police to fulfill
customer satisfaction demands.1 58 As currently implemented,
however, the neoliberal market orientation has not only
detrimentally impacted police-community relations but also
increased the dangers inherent in police-citizen encounters.
V. INCREASING THE STAKES: DANGERS IN POLICE-CITIZEN
ENCOUNTERS

The assessment of inappropriately high criminal justice fees
(and fines) has already led to a loss of legitimacy for law
enforcement, at least in certain communities, "by supporting the
perception that the [justice] system privileges budgetary
imperatives over the needs of justice." 159 As this perception carries
from traffic enforcement through to wider policing activities the
police may further lose legitimacy, especially in minority
communities. There the impact is most starkly experienced in

157 See MARK BEvIR, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 238-41 (2010) (discussing police officer
responses to neoliberal reforms).
158 See Rob Voigt et al., Language from police body camerafootage shows racialdisparities in
officer respect, 114(25) PROCEEDINGS OF NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCI. 6521 (2017), http://www.pnas.
org/content/114/25/6521.full.pdf (documenting substantial disparities in courtesy and respect
police officer display toward black, as compared with white, community members in traffic
stops).

159 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 63, at 7; see

also ArchCity Defenders, supra note 71, at 1-2, 15, 19 (describing the legitimacy problems
surrounding the St. Louis municipal court system).

2017]

COMMODIFYING POLICING

1075

light of disproportionately high levels of policing and the lack of
individual and community resources. 160
The militarization of the police has also been felt most in inner
city minority communities. Confrontational street tactics, such as
New York City's stop-and-frisk, have been used largely in select
neighborhoods. 16 1 In other parts of the country minority drivers
experience a larger number of stops, often for very minor traffic
SWAT-style arrests predominately target Africaninfractions.
American and Latino households. Combined, these experiences,
driven by the availability of military-style equipment, by militarystyle training, 162 and by numerically focused measurements, have
led to the deterioration of police-community relations in many areas
of the country. The reactions of these disadvantaged and highly
policed communities to recent highly publicized killings of AfricanAmericans reflect pent-up frustrations with their overall treatment
by law enforcement agencies and city governments. Some have
argued that the federal support for local police agencies has not only
contributed to their militarization but also has removed
accountability to municipal governments and local communities. 163
The problem may yet be farther reaching as local governments have
lost the confidence of parts of their communities because of the way
Yet, communities and
in which they are being policed.
neighborhoods are not homogeneous. Even within minority and
low-income communities, support for police exists.16 4
Cf. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 63, at 9.
161 NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STOP AND FRISK REPORT (1999),
160

https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil rights/stpifrsk.pdf. See also Brennan
Center for Justice, Ames Grawert & James Cullen, Fact Sheet: Step and Frisk's Effect on
Crime in New York City (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/fact-sheetstop-and-frisks-effect-crime-new-york-city; Benjamin Mueller, New York Police Dept. Agrees
to Curb Stop-and-Frisk Tactics (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/nyregio
n/new-york-police-dept-stop-and-frisk.html.
162 This
type of training reinforces already existing approaches to police-citizen
encounters, which require officers to establish and defend their authority.
163 See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 870, 944 (2015) (describing the erosion of accountability due to decreased budgetary
constraints).
164 See EKINS, supra note 46, at 12-13 (detailing support for police along, among others,
racial, age, income, and educational lines). In fact, minority communities are often split in
their demands for greater enforcement and harsher laws. See, e.g., MICHAEL JAVEN
FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF

PUNISHMENT 191-95 (2015) (documenting widespread support in New York City's AfricanAmerican community for Rockefeller drug laws). See generally MARY PATTELO, BLACK ON
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While police agencies, like any organization, may harbor biased

and trigger-happy officers, the larger problems that underpin the
ongoing relationship crisis derive at least in part from the overall
neoliberal structures that support current practices. Because of
financial pressures on today's police departments and the need for
police to avail themselves of alternative funding sources that
enhance community-police mistrust, individual citizen-police
encounters carry higher stakes for both sides than ever before.
They are fraught with heightened potential for conflict. This
makes policing more confrontational and more dangerous for both
police and citizens.
After all, otherwise low-stakes citizen-police encounters now
threaten the civilian with forfeiture, fines, and fees that will
impose a substantial diminution of family resources, if those are
even available. 165 In addition, individuals whose licenses have
been suspended for failure to pay or appear, or for whom arrest
warrants have been issued for these reasons, are in greater danger
of being stopped.166
That makes a large number of traffic
encounters unnecessarily dangerous. 167 In addition, military-style
encounters also impact citizens emotionally, triggering a loss of
self-regard, and may lead to a self-perception of criminality. 168

THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY (2007) (discussing the impact of

race and class on urban gentrification in a Chicago neighborhood).
165 Some of those with arrest warrants for failure to pay may fear yet harsher ramifications,
such as deportation. Shakeer Rahman & Robin Steinberg, Opinion, Sanctuary Cities in Name
Only, N.Y. TIMEs A27 (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/sanctuar
y-cities-in-name-only.html?mcubz-1.
166 Out of Ferguson's population of approximately 21,000, over 16,000 had outstanding
arrest warrants.
1, at 6, 55.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., FERGUSON REPORT, supra note

Psychological reactions to legal debt-decreased "self-worth, self-respect, and selfdetermination"-may also result in bitterness toward law enforcement agencies. Torie
Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How MunicipalFines Become CrushingDebt in the Shadow of the
New Debtors'Prisons,51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 217 (2016).
167 For a discussion of potential dangers inherent in any traffic stop, see Jack Dunphy,
The Danger That Traffic Stops Can Present to Police, NATL REV. (Sept. 26, 2015), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/424661/police-traffic-stops-danger; Henry Pierson Curtis,
Traffic stops among most dangerouspolice duties, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 9, 2010), http://

articles.orlandosentinel.com/20lO- 12-09/news/os-traffic-stops-deadly-20101209_1_phillipe-lo
uis-officer-jared-famularo-officer-edward-diaz.
16s There is substantial literature that demonstrates the effect surveillance has on the
way in which we think about ourselves. Surveillance structures the lives of those observed
and changes the way in which observers think about the surveilled. See, e.g., Neil M.
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As police use citizen encounters to bolster budgets and enhance
performance measures, for them the stakes to succeed have also
increased. The Report on Ferguson noted, "many officers appear
to see some residents .

.

. less as constituents to be protected than

as potential offenders and sources of revenue." 169 That attitude
may make officers more reluctant to acknowledge error. Instead
they will be more inclined to issue citations and consider
forfeitures. In Ferguson, police had internal competitions to see
"who can issue the largest number of citations during a single
With higher stakes, job pressures and stress grow,
stop."170
Those
possibly leading to greater perceptions of danger.
developments will inevitably trigger a spiral that continues to
worsen community-police relations.17 1
The neoliberal funding decreases for government and the
attendant drive for accountability and performance measures have
been important contributors to the deteriorating relationship
between police and over-policed minority communities. Unless
these underlying issues are being addressed, it is unlikely that the
relationship between the two will improve substantially.
VI. CONCLUSION
The neoliberal economic lens highlights the relationship
between economics, ideology, and policing. The current critique of
globalization may lead to a rethinking of neoliberalism. Yet, even
without a dramatic shift in the economic model, the path of other
Western democracies may provide an alternative. As the German
state has been retracting under the global neoliberal approach, it
has acknowledged that this implies a concomitant limitation on
the state's ability to police its citizens. Criminality has been
accepted as normal, as a largely temporary component of the lives
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013) (discussing the
harms surveillance poses on those watched).
169 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
170 Id. at 11.
171 A possible alternative that would lead to less dangerous police-citizen encounters is the
greater use of technology for traffic control. Great Britain, for example, has been using
speed cameras and ACTV extensively. See, e.g., Helen Wells, Getting Around and Getting
On: Self-Interested Resistance to Technology in Law Enforcement Contexts, 11 ANNUAL REV.
OF L. & SOC. SCI 175, 189 (2015) (discussing avoidance strategies of the citizens who view
themselves as law-abiding).
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of a majority of the population. With that recognition comes
restrained social control and policing, scaled to the fiscal resources
available. 172 If we are unwilling to fund police at the level desired,
the solution is not to criminalize the poorest part of the population
and impose the fiscal burden for the criminal justice system upon
them but rather to restrict enforcement to offenses most corrosive
to society.

172 MICHAEL KUBINK, STRAFEN UND

(2002).
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